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Recent work on consequentialism has revealed it to be more flexible than previously
thought. Consequentialists have shown how their theory can accommodate certain
features with which it has long been considered incompatible, such as agent-centered
constraints. This flexibility is usually thought to work in consequentialism’s favor. I want
to cast doubt on this assumption. I begin by putting forward the strongest statement of
consequentialism’s flexibility: the claim that, whatever set of intuitions the best non-
consequentialist theory accommodates, we can construct a consequentialist theory that
can do the same while still retaining whatever is compelling about consequentialism. I
argue that if this is true then most likely the non-consequentialist theory with which
we started will turn out to have that same compelling feature. So while this extreme
flexibility, if indeed consequentialism has it (a question I leave to the side), makes
consequentialism more appealing, it makes non-consequentialism more appealing too.
I. INTRODUCTION
Consequentialism has long been subject to criticism for failing to do
as good a job as non-consequentialism of accommodating widespread
intuitions about cases. Recent moral philosophers such as Hare, Sen,
Scheffler, Railton, Brink and Broome have aimed to show that conse-
quentialism has greater flexibility, or ability to accommodate these in-
tuitions, than it has been credited for. But if we accept these widespread
intuitions, why not just adopt non-consequentialism? The thought must
be that we give up something important if we abandon consequen-
tialism in favor of non-consequentialism. What I aim to show here is
that consequentialists have not yet shown us how it can be true both
(1) that consequentialism can deliver the intuitively plausible case-
specific verdicts that non-consequentialism can deliver and (2) that we
give up something important when we move from consequentialism to
non-consequentialism. In fact, the very premises likely to be used in
arguments for the first claim can be used to cast doubt on the second.
Before explaining why this is the case, I first need to make claims
(1) and (2) more precise. In claim (1), the term ‘the intuitively
plausible case-specific verdicts that non-consequentialism can deliver’
should be understood as designating all such verdicts. Or, more
precisely it should be understood as designating the most intuitively
plausible consistent set of case-specific verdicts (since there might be
contradictory verdicts each of which we find intuitively plausible) that
non-consequentialism can deliver, where ‘case-specific verdicts’ are
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claims about the moral permissibility of specific actions. Thus, claim
(1) is the claim that consequentialism can deliver the most intuitively
plausible set of claims about the moral permissibility of specific actions
that non-consequentialism can deliver. This claim, which I will label
‘Consequentializability’, has been argued for by several authors.1
Claim (2) holds that we give up something important when we
move from consequentialism to non-consequentialism. We need
to be specific, however, about which versions of consequentialism
and non-consequentialism we are concerned about. It seems that
in considering whether to abandon consequentialism in favor of
non-consequentialism, consequentialists should care specifically about
whether the best version of consequentialism is better than the
best version of non-consequentialism. Therefore, claim (2) should
be construed as asserting that we give up something important in
moving from the best version of consequentialism to the best version of
non-consequentialism.
The remaining ambiguity stems from the presence of the term ‘give
up something important’ in claim (2). What is it about the best version
of consequentialism that consequentialists would not want to give
up, but might have to give up in the move to the best version of
non-consequentialism? Broadly speaking, there are two possibilities.
First, there might be some compelling idea with which the best
version of consequentialism is compatible and the best version of
non-consequentialism is incompatible. Call this ‘something important’
the Compelling Idea. Second, the best version of consequentialism
might embody some desirable quality, such as simplicity, power or
coherence, that the best version of non-consequentialism lacks. Call
this ‘something important’ the Desirable Quality. It is evident that
the consequentialists who hold fast to claims (1) and (2) believe that
(2) is true on the first interpretation, where the move from the best
version of consequentialism to the best version of non-consequentialism
requires giving up some Compelling Idea. When consequentialists
argue for claim (1), they make ideas the issue; they implicitly accept
the notion that normative ethical theories should be judged according
to what ideas they can accommodate, and they proceed to argue that
consequentialism does a better job of accommodating a certain group
1 James Dreier, ‘Structures of Normative Theories’, Monist 76 (1993), pp. 19–30; Jennie
Louise, ‘Relativity of Value and the Consequentialist Umbrella’, Philosophical Quarterly
54 (2004), pp. 518–36; Michael Smith, ‘Neutral and Relative Value after Moore’, Ethics
113 (2003), pp. 576–98; Douglas Portmore, ‘Consequentializing Moral Theories’, Pacific
Philosophical Quarterly 88 (2007), pp. 39–73; Graham Oddie and Peter Milne, ‘Act
and Value: Expectation and Representability of Moral Theories’, Theoria 57.1–2 (1991),
pp. 42–56.
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of ideas – intuitively plausible case-specific verdicts – than we might
have thought.
Given these two clarifications, we should now interpret claim (2) as
saying that the best version of consequentialism is, and the best version
of non-consequentialism is not, compatible with the Compelling Idea.
This claim, which I will label ‘Superiority’, is reasonably imputable to
Sen, Scheffler, and others, and has actually been argued for by Douglas
Portmore.2
II. WHAT DO WE GET OUT OF THE TRUTH OF
CONSEQUENTIALIZABILITY?
My goal is to demonstrate that the arguments likely to be used in
support of Consequentializability can be used against Superiority. In
fact, on the assumption that Consequentializability is true, I will make
a prima-facie case for the denial of Superiority, which I will call ‘Parity’:
Parity: If the best version of consequentialism is compatible with the
Compelling Idea, then the best version of non-consequentialism is compatible
with the Compelling Idea.3
My argument will be lengthy and detailed, but the basic idea behind it
is quite simple: since consequentialism tells us that the moral permissi-
bility of an action depends on the value of the resulting state of affairs,
what case-specific verdicts a version of consequentialism can deliver
depends on what value theory it includes. If Consequentializability
is true, that means that the consequentialist can construct a value
theory such that her version of consequentialism delivers the most
plausible set of case-specific verdicts that can be delivered in a non-
consequentialist framework. And if the resulting version of consequen-
tialism is compatible with the Compelling Idea, then a fortiori the
value theory is too. Now take the version of non-consequentialism
that delivers that same set of case-specific verdicts and call it N.
In order to make N compatible with the Compelling Idea, thereby
demonstrating the truth of Parity, we simply need to incorporate that
same value theory into N. In other words, once the consequentialist
shows how we can have the Compelling Idea and the most plausible
set of case-specific verdicts in a single package, there is no more
reason to think that the best version of non-consequentialism – the
2 Douglas Portmore, ‘Consequentializing Moral Theories’, and ‘Consequentializing’,
Philosophy Compass 4 (2009), pp. 329–47.
3 The truth-functional form of Superiority is P & ∼Q (the best version of
consequentialism is compatible with the Compelling Idea and the best version of non-
consequentialism is not). P &∼Q is equivalent to∼(P Q). The denial of∼(P Q) is P Q,
which is the truth-functional form of Parity (if the best version of consequentialism is
compatible with the Compelling Idea then the best version of non-consequentialism is
too).
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version that delivers that set – will be incompatible with the Compelling
Idea. All the non-consequentialist has to do in order to make her
theory compatible with the Compelling Idea is accept the fruits of the
consequentialist’s labor.
This section will be dedicated to laying out this argument in a more
formal manner.
We begin, again, by assuming that Consequentializability is true. To
establish the truth of Consequentializability, one must take the most
plausible set of case-specific verdicts that non-consequentialism can
deliver and put forward a value theory that shows that these verdicts
can be delivered in a consequentialist framework. Since my opponent
and I agree, at least for the sake of argument, that this can be done, it
is not necessary to illustrate fully how it can be done.4 Nevertheless, a
bit of illustration might help capture the flavor of what is going on.
Suppose, for instance, that the most plausible set of case-
specific verdicts includes agent-centered restrictions. Agent-centered
restrictions are restrictions on an agent’s performing acts of a certain
type. On a standard understanding of what consequentialism is, it
appears not to be able to accommodate agent-centered restrictions.
Consequentialists believe that an action token is permissible for an
agent, A, if and only if there is no other action available to A that
would have a better outcome. Given this claim, no matter how bad a
type of action’s outcome is it will be permissible (obligatory, in fact)
to perform a token of that action if doing so will prevent an action of
the same type from being undertaken multiple times. After all, if one
person’s X-ing leads to a bad outcome, then five people’s X-ing must
lead to a really bad outcome. Therefore, there are no types of actions
such that all tokens of that type are impermissible for some agent.
Douglas Portmore has identified a value theory that gets
consequentialists out of this bind. On this value theory, the value of
the state of affairs that would result from an agent’s X-ing is always
relative to that person. In other words, value is agent-relative. Because
of this, it might be impermissible for an agent to perform an action
with a bad outcome even if performing the action would prevent five
other people from doing the same. For instance, suppose the agent faces
the choice of whether to kill an innocent person in order to prevent five
other people from each killing an innocent person. We might reasonably
argue that relative to the agent, it is better that he not engage in killing.
Engaging in killing would be inconsistent with the inviolability of the
person who gets killed. Since inviolability, if it exists, is grounded in
personhood, one person’s violability entails everyone else’s violability.
4 For an argument to the effect that it cannot be done, or at least that it is not likely
to be accomplished, see Mark Schroeder, ‘Teleology, Agent-Relative Value, and “Good” ’,
Ethics 117 (2007), pp. 265–95.
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Since the agent has a reason to prefer that he be inviolable (this reason
may be bound up in considerations of his dignity), he has a reason to
prefer that others be inviolable, and thus that he not engage in killing.
If the argument goes through, then the agent is required to refrain from
killing. In other words, the agent is under an agent-centered restriction
to not kill.
Although ultimately I am going to argue that the truth of Consequen-
tializability does not give us a reason to think that we give up something
important in the move from consequentialism to non-consequentialism,
I do want to concede that the truth of Consequentializability would
mean that it is possible to construct more plausible versions of con-
sequentialism than was previously thought possible. Demonstrating
how consequentialism can accommodate, for instance, agent-centered
restrictions would indeed make consequentialism more appealing. I
merely want to show that the truth of Consequentializability would
also, surprisingly, yield the result that we can construct more plausible
versions of non-consequentialism than was previously thought possible.
The way I aim to explain this, again, is by taking Consequentializabil-
ity as given and arguing from it to a further thesis, Parity. I will argue
for Parity by way of conditional proof. I will assume its antecedent
(the claim that the best version of consequentialism is compatible
with the Compelling Idea) and then conduct a search for a possible
world in which its consequent (the claim that the best version of non-
consequentialism is compatible with the Compelling Idea) is false. In
other words, I will search for a counterexample to Parity. My conclusion
will be that most likely there isn’t one.
To begin the search for a counterexample, we first need to get some
idea of what the Compelling Idea is. As a first pass we can say that
the Compelling Idea either is or is not a proposition that is part of
consequentialist theories themselves. If it is not, then it is going to
have to be a metaethical claim. This is because in order for there
to be a counterexample to Parity the Compelling Idea must be a
proposition with which some normative ethical theories (including the
best version of consequentialism) are compatible and others (i.e., the
best version of non-consequentialism) are not. If the Compelling Idea
is not itself a proposition about right and wrong, good and bad – the
sort of proposition out of which normative ethical theories such as
consequentialism are built – then it is going to have to be a proposition
about metaphysics, epistemology or normativity that has some bearing
on which propositions about right and wrong and good and bad are true.
Otherwise, it will be irrelevant to the choice between consequentialism
and non-consequentialism. Any metaphysical, epistemological or
normative claim that is relevant to the identification of the correct
normative ethical theory is, I shall stipulate, a metaethical claim.
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I am going to set aside the possibility that the Compelling Idea
might be a metaethical claim, for the simple reason that the class of
metaethical claims is just too large to be surveyed in the way we need.
Given the great variety of metaethical claims that are out there, I
cannot imagine what general considerations one might adduce to show
that the Compelling Idea simply cannot be a metaethical claim. It bears
mentioning, however, that it seems unlikely that the Compelling Idea
will be a metaethical claim.
For one thing, some metaethical claims have no bearing on what
normative ethical theories are true. Non-reductive realism is a good
example. This is the view that moral properties are real features of
the world that do not reduce to non-moral features of the world. We
could accept or reject this as we wish and remain entirely neutral on
substantive ethical matters. For another, the metaethical claims that
do have substantive implications usually do not make the cut between
acceptable and unacceptable at the line between consequentialism
and non-consequentialism or at the line between some version(s)
of consequentialism and everything else. For instance, in his latest
defense of Consequentializability, Portmore identifies the following as
the Compelling Idea:
Teleological Conception of Reasons: The reasons there are for and against
performing a given act are wholly determined by the reasons there are for
and against preferring its outcome to those of its available alternatives, such
that, if S has most reason to perform ai, then, of all the outcomes that S could
bring about, S has most reason to desire that oi (i.e., ai’s outcome) obtains.5
Yet in order to connect the teleological conception of reasons
to consequentialism, Portmore has to redefine consequentialism.
According to him consequentialism is the view that
an act’s deontic status is wholly determined by the reasons there are for and
against preferring its outcome to those of its available alternatives, such that,
if S is morally required to perform ai, then, of all the outcomes that S could
bring about, S has most reason to desire that oi (i.e., ai’s outcome) obtains.6
The other possibility, and hence the one more worthy of our attention
for now, is that the Compelling Idea is a claim found in consequentialist
theories. My goal is to search for a counterexample to Parity on the
assumption that this is the case.
First, however, we need to identify the elements of consequentialist
theories. I will be generous here, allowing in some kinds of claim
that one might doubt are really parts of consequentialist theories
themselves. (Given my argumentative strategy, this generosity can
5 Portmore, ‘Consequentializing’, p. 333.
6 Portmore, ‘Consequentializing’, p. 333.
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only help my opponent.) I am going to allow that consequentialist
theories have four elements: First, one or more moral principles.
Second, evaluative claims – claims about what is good. Moral principles,
combined with non-moral facts and evaluative claims, yield the third
part of a normative ethical theory: a set of case-specific verdicts.
The fourth part is one or more determination claims – claims about
what kinds of fact determine the truth of the case-specific verdicts.
Determination claims are to be distinguished from moral principles
in the following way: whereas moral principles state necessary
and/or sufficient conditions for an action’s rightness or wrongness,
determination claims identify the kinds of fact that ground an action’s
rightness or wrongness.7
Having identified the elements of consequentialist theories, we can
begin our search for a counterexample to Parity. The following notation
will be used: The best non-consequentialist theory will be labeled
‘N’, the best consequentialist theory will be labeled ‘C’, and the most
plausible set of case-specific verdicts that non-consequentialism can
deliver will be labeled ‘’.
1. Moral principles
Suppose C’s Compelling Idea is one of its moral principles. (This was
Portmore’s claim in his original defense of Superiority – he believed that
the Compelling Idea was the proposition that it is always permissible
to maximize the good.)8 In virtue of what might N be incompatible
with the Compelling Idea? Not in virtue of N’s case-specific verdicts. By
definition,  is N’s set of case-specific verdicts. (Since N is defined as
the best non-consequentialist theory and the best non-consequentialist
theory would yield the most plausible set of deontic verdicts that a non-
consequentialist theory can yield.) If Consequentializability holds, then
 is also C’s set of case-specific verdicts, and therefore  is compatible
with the Compelling Idea.
The only other possibility is that N might be incompatible with the
Compelling Idea in virtue of its own moral principles. But this turns
out not to be true either. Consequentialist moral principles come in
varied forms, but one generalization we can make about them is that
they all assert some connection between evaluative facts and moral
facts. Therefore, constructing N so as to make it compatible with
a consequentialist moral principle is as simple as ensuring that N
contains no principles asserting some connection between evaluative
and moral facts.
7 Shelly Kagan nicely elucidates the importance of moral explanation in The Limits of
Morality (Oxford, 1989), pp. 13–15.
8 ‘Consequentializing Moral Theories’.
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No matter what appears in, this will always be possible. There will
usually be a number of ways to do this, but at least one method will
always be available: the construction of a ten commandments-style list
of DOs and DON’Ts, one for every member of . For instance, if ‘it is
impermissible to kill Jones’ is a member of, just put ‘DON’T kill Jones’
on the list of principles in N. Since commandment-style principles make
no claims about the connection between evaluative facts and moral
facts, they are consistent with all consequentialist moral principles,
including whichever one the Compelling Idea is.
One might object that N cannot contain a set of ten commandments-
style principles since N, by definition, is the best version of non-
consequentialism and the best version of non-consequentialism would
not contain a set of ten commandments-style principles. After all, ten
commandments-style theories, as Shelly Kagan has pointed out, lack
simplicity, power and coherence.9 Even if this is true, however, it does
not help us find a counterexample to Parity. If N must be simple,
powerful and coherent, then C must as well. However, I am not aware
of any argument to the effect that there is a version of consequentialism
that embodies these virtues and yields . If there is no such version
of consequentialism, then the antecedent of Parity is false, and thus
Parity is trivially true.
Indeed, there is a strong reason to think that C does not possess
these virtues: value theories that are simple, powerful and coherent do
not, when combined with consequentialist moral principles, yield the
kind of case-specific verdicts likely to appear in , and any normative
ethical theory that takes on a complex, weak and non-coherent value
theory in order to accommodate these verdicts is ipso facto complex,
weak and non-coherent. Portmore, for instance, in constructing a
version of consequentialism that accommodates, puts forward a value
theory with a host of odd features, including agent-relative value,
dual ranking (ranking of outcomes on two independent criteria) and
arbitrary multiplicative weights (‘Consequentializing Moral Theories’,
Section IV). That Portmore’s version of C fails to embody the three
virtues is, of course, insufficient to establish that C must fail on this
count, but then neither have we been shown that N must have this
defect.
2. Evaluative claims
Suppose C’s Compelling Idea is one of its evaluative claims. As I just
argued, on the assumption that Consequentializability is true we can
construct N such that it delivers  and contains no moral principle
asserting a connection between evaluative facts and moral facts. This
9 Kagan, The Limits of Morality, p. 11.
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being the case, we can append any value theory we wish to N. So no
matter which evaluative claim the Compelling Idea is, we can make
N consistent with it. Hence there is no counterexample to Parity to be
found here.
3. Case-specific verdicts
Suppose that C’s Compelling Idea is one of the case-specific verdicts
that it yields. Again, by definition,  is N’s set of case-specific verdicts.
And if Consequentializability holds, then  is also C’s set of case-
specific verdicts. So if the Compelling Idea is a case-specific verdict
then it will be found in , and hence N will yield it. Hence there is no
counterexample to Parity to be found here either.
4. Determination claims
I argued above that if the Compelling Idea is a moral principle, then,
assuming Consequentializability holds, we will be able to construct
N such that the Compelling Idea is compatible with it. Thus I am
relying heavily on a heretofore implicit claim that non-consequentialist
theories can contain consequentialist moral principles. My view, which
I take to be intuitively plausible enough not to require defense, is that
a normative ethical theory that accepts a mixture of consequentialist
and non-consequentialist moral principles is non-consequentialist if
its determination claims are non-consequentialist. A determination
claim is non-consequentialist just in case it holds that the kinds of fact
that determine the permissibility of an action are not exclusively facts
about the goodness of the state of affairs that the action would bring
about (or, for rule-consequentialism, facts about whether the action is
prohibited by the set of rules the general adherence to which would be
most conducive to the common good).10
Imagine, for instance, a theory that includes the following two moral
principles:
(a) An act is wrong if its performance under the circumstances would
be disallowed by any system of rules for the general regulation
of behavior which no one could reasonably reject as a basis for
informed, unforced general agreement.
(b) An act is wrong if there was an alternative to it available to the
agent that would have brought about a better state of affairs.
Such a theory is non-consequentialist if it also contains the following
determination claim:
10 We should of course construe ‘state of affairs’ broadly enough to encompass facts
about the act itself. That way a determination claim remains consequentialist even if it
takes into account, for instance, the badness of a right being violated.
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(c) Every wrong action is wrong because its performance under the
circumstances would be disallowed by any system of rules for
the general regulation of behavior which no one could reasonably
reject as a basis for informed, unforced general agreement.
Being lenient about moral principles requires being strict about
determination claims. To defend Parity while insisting that non-
consequentialist theories can accept consequentialist moral principles,
we are going to have to say that for a theory to be non-consequentialist
it must contain a non-consequentialist determination claim. And this
raises the prospect that if C’s Compelling Idea is a determination claim
then we will not be able to construct N such that it is compatible with
that claim. This prospect is made all the more likely by the fact that
determination claims are by their very nature exclusive. To illustrate
the point, consider the following determination claim:
(d) Every wrong action is wrong because there was an alternative to
it available to the agent that would have brought about a better
state of affairs.
We have to say that (c) and (d) are incompatible unless we want to admit
the possibility of widespread moral overdetermination. By contrast,
there is nothing troublesome about saying that (a) and (b), the two
moral principles, are compatible.
So if C’s Compelling Idea is a determination claim, then we have
our counterexample to Parity. But I doubt that C’s Compelling Idea
is a determination claim. On the contrary, in fact, consequentialism’s
determination claims are usually seen as one its main drawbacks.
If Jones stalks and kills an innocent person in cold blood, any
consequentialist theory will tell us something like: it’s the resulting
state of affairs that grounds the rightness or wrongness of Jones’s
action. Thus, even if consequentialism gives the right answer in this
case – that Jones acted wrongly – it will give it for what is intuitively the
wrong reason. This is a well-worn complaint, of course,11 but strikingly
few theorists have made an effort to respond to it12 or to give an
argument for a consequentialist determination claim.13
11 See, for instance: John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass., 1971), pp. 26,
28; Bernard Williams, ‘A Critique of Utilitarianism’, in J. J. C. Smart and Bernard
Williams, Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge, 1973), p. 99; Tim Mulgan, ‘Rule
Consequentialism and Famine’, Analysis 54 (1994), pp. 187–92.
12 An exception is William Shaw, ‘The Consequentialist Perspective’, Contemporary
Debates in Moral Theory, ed. J. Dreier (Malden, Mass., 2006).
13 Part of the problem is that the distinction between consequentialism’s moral
principles claims and its determination claims often goes unnoticed, and therefore
some theorists think they are defending the latter when in fact they are defending the
former. See, for instance, R. Euguene Bales, ‘Act-Utilitarianism: Account of Right-Making
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Now one might object that I have unfairly stacked the deck against
consequentialist determination claims by presenting an insufficiently
general version of the one we have been discussing. I said just now
that it seems that consequentialism will give the right answer for the
wrong reason if it says that Jones’s cold-blooded killing is wrong on
the grounds that Jones could have brought about a better state of
affairs by doing something else. While such a determination claim looks
less than compelling, we might think that the general claim of which
it is an instance is unimpeachable. That claim would be something
along the lines of ‘morality is about doing what’s best’. One might
even suppose that what accounts for the literature’s dearth of defenses
of consequentialist determination claims is that such claims, when
abstracted to a sufficient level of generality, are just obviously true.
This appearance, I submit, is deceptive. Notice, first, that ‘morality is
about doing what’s best’ is not a determination claim. A determination
claim identifies some facts as determining the truth of some
proposition(s). ‘Morality is about doing what’s best’ doesn’t do this. The
determination claim that best captures the spirit of this proclamation
is, ‘The fact whether X-ing will bring about the best available state of
affairs determines whether X-ing is permissible.’ Already this begins
to look more debatable.
And things get worse for the consequentialist, for her determination
claim, as we are now interpreting it, is ambiguous in a troubling way.
There is an ambiguity in the term ‘best’ – the question being whether we
are talking about moral or non-moral bestness. Suppose it’s the former.
In this case, the consequentialist determination claim would read: the
fact whether X-ing will bring about the morally best state of affairs
determines whether X-ing is permissible. But a consequentialist cannot
say this, for the following reason. If she believes in moral bestness, then
she believes in moral goodness. And if anything is morally good, surely a
permissible act is, qua permissible act. Or, at the very least, permissible
acts are morally better than impermissible ones. Therefore, whether X-
ing would bring about the morally best possible state of affairs depends
on whether X-ing itself is morally good. But if the determination claim
we are considering were true, then it would also be the case that
whether X-ing itself is morally good depends on whether X-ing would
bring about the morally best possible state of affairs. Hence, this version
of consequentialism entails circular explanation, in which A explains
B and B explains A.14
Characteristics or Decision-Making Procedure?’, American Philosophical Quarterly 8
(1971), pp. 257–65.
14 William K. Frankena makes roughly the same point in Ethics, 2nd edn. (Englewood
Cliffs, NJ, 1973), p. 14.
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Therefore the consequentialist must instruct us to interpret ‘best’
in her determination claim as signifying ‘non-morally best’. So her
determination claim is now, ‘The fact whether X-ing will bring about
the non-morally best state of affairs available to the agent determines
whether X-ing is permissible.’ This is not very compelling.
Thus, whether we look at consequentialist determination claims from
afar or in an applied context, they don’t look like the sort of thing
that deserves the ‘Compelling Idea’ label. Therefore, we can admit that
there would be a counterexample to Parity if the Compelling Idea were
a determination claim, and yet be reasonably confident that there is no
counterexample to Parity.
Taking the truth of Consequentializability as given, I have argued
in this section in support of the claim, which I labeled Parity, that if
the best version of consequentialism is compatible with the Compelling
Idea, then the best version of non-consequentialism is as well. I have
focused my efforts on determining just what shape the Compelling Idea
might take such that the best non-consequentialist theory, N, could not
accommodate it. I first dismissed the possibility that the Compelling
Idea might be a metaethical claim. I then identified dispositive reasons
to believe that N will not be incompatible with the Compelling Idea if
the latter is a moral principle, evaluative claim or case-specific verdict.
And we found a strong reason to think that the Compelling Idea is not
a determination claim, meaning that we needn’t worry about which
determination claims N is or is not compatible with. Thus, we have
a prima-facie case for the truth of Parity, and hence the falsity of
Superiority. The burden of proof is now on the advocate of Superiority
to undermine this case by showing one of the following two things:
(1) the Compelling Idea is a consequentialist determination claim, or
(2) the Compelling Idea is a metaethical claim with which the best
version of consequentialism is compatible and the best version of non-
consequentialism is incompatible.
III. CONCLUSION
Various theorists have argued for Consequentializability – the claim
that consequentialism is flexible enough to deliver all the case-specific
verdicts that non-consequentialism can deliver. I have argued that this
extreme flexibility would turn out to cut both ways for consequen-
tialism. I did this by assuming that consequentialism is indeed that
flexible and then making a prima-facie case for believing that if the
best version of consequentialism delivers these case-specific verdicts
while remaining compatible with consequentialism’s Compelling Idea,
then the best version of non-consequentialism does the same. My case
was based on pointing out that if Consequentializability is true then
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non-consequentialists needn’t deny any consequentialist claims except
their determination claim, which is probably not consequentialism’s
Compelling Idea. On reflection, this result is not surprising. One
cannot bring consequentialism closer to non-consequentialism without
bringing non-consequentialism closer to consequentialism.
And what of those theorists who don’t go so far as to defend
Consequentializability – the theorists who argue that consequentialism
is more flexible than it has been credited for, but do not depict
consequentialism as flexible enough to accommodate all the case-
specific intuitions that non-consequentialism can accommodate?
This group includes many of the most prominent consequentialists,
several of whom I mentioned at the outset: Hare, Scheffler, Sen,
Railton, Brink and Broome. Since they do not argue for anything
so extreme as Consequentializability, their arguments do not show
that the most plausible version of non-consequentialism is compatible
with consequentialism’s Compelling Idea. And so their versions of
consequentialism retain an advantage over non-consequentialism. But
this advantage comes with a disadvantage, which is of course that
their versions of consequentialism, by hypothesis, do not accommodate
all the case-specific intuitions that non-consequentialism can. Such
consequentialists are free to argue that the intuitions that they cannot
accommodate are ones that (for independent reasons) we ought to
reject. But if they are right that we ought to reject them, then the
best non-consequentialist theory will reject them too. This version of
non-consequentialism will issue the same set of case-specific verdicts
as the best version of consequentialism, and so that version of non-
consequentialism, for reasons explained in Section II, will most likely
be compatible with consequentialism’s Compelling Idea. Therefore,
these consequentialists are in trouble either way.
What strategy, then, should consequentialists adopt in their effort to
demonstrate the superiority of their theory? The lesson to be learned
from the failure of the truth of Consequentializability to advance the
cause of consequentialism is that consequentialists should not try to
meet non-consequentialism on its own terms. They should in fact do the
exact opposite. A completely unapologetic version of consequentialism,
a version of consequentialism that makes no effort to accommodate
widespread case-specific intuitions, is the consequentialist’s best hope.
Consequentialists should embrace unapologetic consequentialism –
taking theorists such as Peter Singer, Shelley Kagan and Peter Unger
as their model – and then either argue us out of our intuitions
or convince us that our intuitions have no evidential force. The
reason they should take this extreme step is that it is the only
way to force non-consequentialists into an uncomfortable position.
When consequentialists attempt to tweak consequentialism so that it
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can accommodate the case-specific verdicts that non-consequentialism
has always been able to deliver, they have to insert all manner
of strange epicycles, such as agent-relative value, into their value
theories. But if instead consequentialists convince us that we should
accept the case-specific verdicts that appear to follow from the classic
versions of consequentialism, such as Bentham’s or Sidgwick’s, then
it will be the non-consequentialists who have some explaining do
to. Consequentialism’s determination claim would appear to be a
more simple, powerful and elegant explanation of the truth of those
verdicts than any possible non-consequentialist determination claim.
Consequentialists would then be well on their way to demonstrating
that the best version of consequentialism embodies a desirable quality
that the best version of non-consequentialism lacks.
This brings us back to the first fork in the road for the
consequentialist who seeks to show that the best version of con-
sequentialism is superior to the best version of non-consequentialism.
That fork was the decision whether to insist that the best version
of non-consequentialism fails to accommodate some Compelling Idea
or that the best version of non-consequentialism fails to embody
some Desirable Quality. I have just now suggested that the latter
path is open to consequentialists. The former path, however, was
always a dead end. The consequentialist gains little by showing
that non-consequentialism fails to accommodate some Compelling
Idea unless she can demonstrate that the various compelling ideas
that non-consequentialism can accommodate – i.e., our case-specific
intuitions – can be accommodated by consequentialism. But it turns
out that the weapon consequentialists can wield in order to prove this
latter claim undermines the arguments they might make for the former
claim. The reason for this should be clear by now. Their weapon –
consequentialism’s flexibility – is a double-edged sword.15
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15 This article was presented as a paper before audiences at the Department of Bioethics
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2008 annual meetings of the Wisconsin Philosophical Association and the International
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helping me to straighten out my thoughts on this issue, correcting numerous mistakes,
and offering encouragement on the worthiness of the project.
